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Theo A. F. Kuipers
STRUCTURES FOR COMPUTATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN DRUG 
DESIGN
REPLY TO ALEXANDER VAN DEN BOSCH 
The title of Alexander van den Bosch’s contribution is a nice allusion to the 
title of SiS. However, it not only deals with structures in the more specific 
sense of the structuralist approach as characterized in Ch. 12, it also deals with 
two other topics that are presented in SiS, viz. design research (Ch. 10) and 
computational approaches (Ch. 11). Van den Bosch explicitly deals with de-
sign research, notably drug design. Design research is normally (almost) ne-
glected by philosophers of science, but as Van den Bosch’s paper nicely illus-
trates, although (modern) design research is strongly related to nomological 
research, it makes very much sense to distinguish it from the latter, not only in 
goal but also in method, despite the fact that both types of research can be rep-
resented in set-theoretic terms. Moreover, Van den Bosch also indicates in his 
paper the way in which computational means can be used in drug design re-
search when described in these terms, of course, with modest pretensions. 
Here he refers to some impressive computational studies which others from 
time to time attribute to me. Incorrectly, unfortunately, for they are the work of 
my namesake Benjamin Kuipers (no relation).
In this reply I confine myself to two related points of terminological criti-
cism dealing with nomological research. In both cases it not only seems con-
ceptually important in theory, but also in practice I frequently meet people 
who, like myself and Van den Bosch, are not always aware of some important 
distinctions that can and should be made. 
Epistemological and Methodological Categories 
In Table 1 and Figure 2 Van den Bosch categorizes the four types of conceptu-
ally possible models that are generated by the comparison of the models al-
lowed by a theory and those that are, as a matter of unknown fact, empirically 
or nomically possible. Unfortunately, he uses the terminology that I find, apart 
from a specific point (see below) more appropriate for categorizing empiri-
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cally established results. Because these (and only these) categories are meth-
odologically useful I call them the methodological categories, as distinct from 
the epistemological categories (ICR, p. 150 versus p. 158), corresponding to 
Van den Bosch’s Figure 2. So, let me insert in his Table 1 my favorite episte-
mological terminology between brackets, where the first inserted possibility 
refers to my (1992, p. 303) and the second to my (ICR, p. 150): 
Subset MT ME
1 1 0 Explanatory problem (explanatory/external mis-
take)
2 1 1 Empirical success, confirming instance 
(instantial/internal match) 
3 0 1 Empirical anomaly, counterexample 
(instantial/internal mistake) 
4 0 0 Explanatory success (explanatory/external match) 
Table 1. Subsets of conceptually possible models MP of a domain 
(the numbered subsets in the first column refer to Figure 2 of Van den Bosch’s paper) 
Hence, instead of the “problem/success terminology,” which I find more ap-
propriate for methodological purposes, I prefer for (abstract) epistemological 
characterization the “mistake/match terminology.” Regarding the two sug-
gested subcategorizations, viz. “explanatory/instantial” (1992) versus “exter-
nal/internal” (2000), I have no strong preferences. 
The background to the main preference is the following. As soon as we be-
come methodologically realistic, and no longer suppose that we dispose of the 
set of empirical or nomic possibilities (ME), we have to base our judgements 
on realized (and investigated) (types of) possibilities at a certain moment (R)
and the empirical regularities based on them. The latter essentially arise by 
inductive generalization on the basis of R. Their conjunction, which is the 
strongest established empirical regularity, will be indicated by S. In view of 
the fact that Van den Bosch explicitly speaks of “descriptive induction” at the 
beginning of Section 4, it may well be that he assumes in fact that S may be 
equated with ME. Under certain conditions this may be reasonable, though not 
without the risk of being incomplete (ME may still be a proper subset of S) or 
incorrect. The assumption that the data are correct in the sense that the charac-
terizations of R and the inductive jumps leading to S are correct amounts to the 
claim that R is subset of ME, and that the latter is a subset of S.
Be this as it may, as a long as we assume that R is a proper subset of S,
with, if correct, ME as an unknown set in between, we get again four catego-
ries, now methodological ones, see Figure 1. 
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Fig. 1 (adapted from Fig. 2 of Van den Bosch’s paper): Models MT of a hypothesis and empiri-
cally possible models ME of the phenomena of a domain, both part of the conceptually possible 
models MP. The small rectangle indicates R, the large one S.
In our Table 2 we list first the “problem/success” names as used in (1992, p. 
307) and then the first ones from ICR (p. 158), that is, the ones mentioned 
above, but with the qualification ‘established’, abbreviated by ‘est’.
Subset MT R  ME S
1 = MT S 1 0 0 Explanatory problem/ est. external mistake 
2 = MT R 1 1 1 Instantial success/ est. internal match (example) 
3 = R  MT 0 1 1 Instantial problem/ est. internal mistake (counterexam-
ple)
4 = MP S
MT
0 0 0 Explanatory success/ est. external match 
Table 2. Subsets of conceptually possible models MP of a domain, relative to data R/S
(the first column refers to the adapted version of Fig. 2 of Van den Bosch’s paper, i.e., our Fig. 1)
In this way we obtain a clear distinction between epistemological and meth-
odological categories. Of course, I do not bother about these terms as such, but 
about the distinction. Note that Van den Bosch talks about “empirical” suc-
cesses and problems, whereas I used the qualification “instantial,” but this dif-
ference is not very important. 
Confirming Instances 
From the foregoing it follows that one problem with Van den Bosch’s termi-
nology of ‘empirical success’ and ‘confirming instance’ is that it could better 
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main criticism of this terminology and, for that matter, of my 1992 terminol-
ogy of ‘instantial success’, is that the category MT  R not only covers proper 
successes, but also realized possibilities that are merely compatible with T. For 
this reason I add to the phrase ‘est. internal match’ in the table on p. 158 of 
ICR, besides the term ‘example’, the phrase: individual success or neutral in-
stance, where the former could of course also have been called ‘positive in-
stance’. This distinction is also already made in the so-called evaluation matrix 
(ICR, pp. 117-9; SiS, pp. 235-7, p. 307), in terms of positive and neutral in-
stances, besides negative instances (or counterexamples), with the correspond-
ing refinement of the notion of “being more successful.” 
A simple example of the crucial distinction is the fact that the hypothesis 
“all ravens are black” has only one type of counterexample (non-black ravens), 
but two types of individual successes, that is, not only black ravens, but also 
non-black non-ravens, and one type of neutral case: black non-ravens. The 
latter are merely compatible with the hypothesis, that is, the hypothesis has 
nothing to offer, neither when you start with something black, nor when you 
start with a non-raven. For a detailed analysis, see ICR, Ch. 2 and 3; see, how-
ever, also the contribution of Maher and my reply, both in the companion vol-
ume. For the moment I conclude that we should already refine our concepts 
and diagrams corresponding to the epistemological categories by introducing 
(hypothetical) proper subsets of MT and ME with respect to which T, resp. the 
true theory (i.e., the one characterizing ME) has nothing to offer. This would 
automatically generate the suggested refinement of the methodological cate-
gory of ‘established internal match’. Refined diagrams for both types of cate-
gories are still missing. They will easily get complicated, in particular the 
methodological ones, so the challenge is to make them nevertheless as appeal-
ing as possible. For the epistemological point of departure it may be useful to 
start from a diagram in SiS (p. 281), drawn for a similar problem, viz. bringing 
‘irrelevant properties’ into the picture of design research.
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